

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NEA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-08 L-01 SP-02 PM-03 NSC-05

NSCE-00 INR-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 IO-03 SAM-01 ACDA-10

/059 W

----- 116267

R 211005Z APR 75

FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2865

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY SANAA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ABU DHABI 0863

LIMDIS

BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PORS, PINS, MASS, TC

SUBJECT: ADVISORY ROLE OF U.K. AND CERTAIN OTHER COUNTRIES IN UAE

REF: (A) ABUD DHABI 352 (B) STATE A-74

1. EMBASSY HAS RELATIVELY LITTLE TO ADD TO DISCUSSION REF A
OF EXPATRIATE ROLE IN DEFENSE/SECURITY FIELDS. IN PARTICULAR,
OUR SPECIFIC DATA IS STILL LIMITED. SEVERAL POINTS CAN AND
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SHOULD BE REEMPHASIZED OR AMPLIFIED, HOWEVER.

(A) TREND TOWARD ARABIZATION APPEARS CLEARER THAN EVER, WITH MAIN RESTRAINING FACTOR BEING PROBLEMS OF RECRUITING SUFFICIENT ARAB OFFICERS TO FILL JOBS. SUDANESE NAVAL OFFICER, FOR EXAMPLE, TOLD DCM THAT NUMBER OF SUDANESE SERVING WITH ABU DHABI DEFENSE FORCE (ADDF) DUE TO RISE FROM CURRENT 55 OFFICERS AND 95 NCO'S TO 75 OFFICERS, WITH COMPARABLE INCREASE NUMBER NCO'S. WITH REFERENCE TO SEA WING, IN PARTICULAR, SUDANESE HAVE BEEN ASKED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL EIGHT OFFICERS AND NUMBER OF NCO'S ABOVE CURRENT LEVELS SIX OFFICERS AND FIVE NCO'S. IN CASE OF SEA WING, THIS INCREASE RESULTS IN PART FROM EXPANSION OF THAT FORCE, BUT IT ALSO INVOLVES REPLACEMENT OF PAKISTANIS WITH ARABS. SUDANESE OFFICER NOTED THAT EGYPTIANS BEING CALLED ON IN PARTICULAR TO STAFF SEA WING. NEW SEA WING COMMANDER IS EGYPTIAN (AND CONTRARY EARLIER RUMORS, APPARENTLY IS EXPERIENCED NAVAL OFFICER) AND EGYPTIANS WILL REPORTEDLY BE SUPPLYING NUMBER OF OTHER NAVAL OFFICERS. (IN THIS CONNECTION, IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THIS EXCHANGE IS APPARENTLY VERY MUCH MILITARY-TO-MILITARY ARRANGEMENT. EGYPTIAN EMBASSY COUNSELOR, HAVING TOLD DCM WITH SOME ASSURANCE THAT THERE WERE NO PLANS TO SEND EGYPTIAN NAVAL OFFICERS TO ADDF, VOLUNTEERED SOMEWHAT SHEEPISHLY SEVERAL WEEKS AGO THAT NEW EGYPTIAN COMMANDER HAD ARRIVED IN ABU DHABI WITH SEVERAL OTHER OFFICERS WITH EGYPTIAN EMBASSY RECEIVING ABSOLUTELY NO ADVANCE NOTICE.) IN SHORT, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT ADDF WILL CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR ARAB OFFICERS TO REPLACE NOT ONLY BRITISH BUT PAKISTANIS AS WELL (ALTHOUGH PAKS LIKELY TO MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION IN AIR WING LONGER THAN IN ARMY). ON OTHER HAND PROBLEM OF AVAILABILITY IS REAL ONE. SUDANESE OFFICER NOTED SPECIFICALLY THAT ADDF WOULD LIKE TO HAVE MORE EGYPTIANS IN GROUND AND AIR FORCES AS WELL BUT THAT CAIRO HAD REPORTEDLY SAID IT COULD ONLY MEET NAVAL NEEDS FOR PRESENT. IN THIS CONNECTION, EVEN UMONG ARABS IT APPEARS ADDF BEING SELECTIVE, E.G. EGYPTIANS ARE FAVORED BY JORDANIANS, WHILE HOLDING THEIR OWN, DO NOT APPEAR BE BENEFITING FROM ARABIZATION POLICY.

(B) WHILE ACCEPTING FACT THAT BRITISH PRESENCE IS ON DECREASE, IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHAT IMPACT THIS MAY HAVE. BRITISH EMBASSY
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HERE TAKES VERY RELAXED VIEW OF STATUS THEIR ADVISORS WITH VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF UAE MILITARY/SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT. IN FIRST PLACE THEY ARGUE THAT IT HAS BEEN SOME TIME SINCE BRITISH OFFICERS HAVE DOMINATED COMMAND POSITIONS. ATTRITION WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE HAS BEEN LARGELY IN NON-COMMAND POSITIONS. MOREOVER, THEY NOTE THAT KEY POSITION -- THAT OF COMMANDER OF ADDF LAND FORCES, BY FAR AND AWAY THE BIGGEST MILITARY FORCE IN THE UAE -- REMAINS IN HANDS OF

BRITISH SECONDED OFFICER (ALTHOUGH BY HIS OWN ADMISSION HIS DECISION-MAKING POWERS ON IMPORTANT MATTERS SUCH AS ARMS ACQUISITION IS HEAVILY CIRCUMSCRIBED). SECONDLY, BRITISH EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT MANY OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN REPLACED -- PARTICULARLY AMONG THE CONTRACT OFFICERS -- WERE NOT OF HIGHEST CALIBER AND ARE WELL RID OF. FINALLY BRITISH FEEL THAT THERE IS LITTLE THEY CAN DO TO RESIST TREND IN ANY CASE. PRESENT AMBASSADOR AND HIS NUMBER TWO BELIEVE THEIR PREDECESSORS FOUGHT PAKISTANI INROADS NOT ONLY TO NO AVAIL, BUT TO DETRIMENT OF BRITISH POSITION HERE. BRITISH STILL WILLING BE OF ASSISTANCE AND OBVIOUSLY ARE INTERESTED IN CONTRIBUTING TO STABILITY AS THEY CAN. BUT THEY BELIEVE BEST APPROACH IS RELAXED ONE, RESPONDING TO REQUESTS AS RECEIVED. AND THEY QUESTION WHETHER IT IS REALISTIC EITHER NOW OR EVEN IN RECENT PAST TO CREDIT BRITISH ADVISORS WITH THAT MUCH INFLUENCE ON INTERNAL STABILITY IN ANY CASE.

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R 211005Z APR 75

FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2866

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY SANAA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 ABU DHABI 0863

LIMDIS

BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

COMMENT: THERE IS FAIR AMOUNT OF VALIDITY AND GOOD SENSE IN ABOVE BRITISH EMBASSY POSITION. ON OTHER HAND IT IS TO DEGREE SELF-SERVING, PUTTING BEST FACE NOT ONLY ON CONDITIONS HERE BUT ALSO ON LOWER POSTURE DICTATED BY COST CONSIDERATIONS IN LONDON. AS STATED REF A, DECREASE IN BRITISH PRESENCE DOES NOT APPEAR POSE IMMEDIATE THREAT TO UAE SECURITY, BUT, AT SAME TIME, IT IS TREND TO BE REGRETTEED. AT VERY LEAST, AS NOTED REF A, DIMINISHED BRITISH PRESENCE PROBABLY REMOVES RESTRAINING INFLUENCE IN EVENT THERE IS MOVE TO INVOLVE MILITARY IN ACT AGAINST EXISTING POLITICAL STRUCTURE. ON OTHER HAND,
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SHAIKH ZAYID, WHILE FAVORING ARABIZATION, HAS TAKEN PRE-CAUTION NOT TO LET ANY ONE COUNTRY -- NO MATTER HOW FRIENDLY AT PRESENT -- ACHIEVE POSITION WHERE ITS OFFICERS WOULD HAVE OVERALL DOMINANT POSITION IN ADDF. WITH THIS MIXTURE OF CONTROL HE RETAINS DEGREE OF BUILT-IN RESTRAINT AGAINST POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT. ANOTHER PIECE OF INSURANCE IS HIS MAINTENANCE THUS FAR OF HIS PERSONAL PALACE GUARD UNDER A BRITISH OFFICER.

2. ON CIVILIAN SIDE, UAE SOMETIMES APPEARS BE NOTHING MORE THAN MASS OF FOREIGNERS, AMONG THESE, PERHAPS EXPATRIATE IRAQIS AND EGYPTIANS DOMINATE, THOUGH HERE AGAIN ZAYID APPEARS TO FOLLOW CAREFUL POLICY OF NOT LETTING ONE GROUP GET UPPER HAND. BRITISH CONTINUE HANG ON TO NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT POSITIONS THOUGH WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ADMINISTRATIVE/POLICY ROLES THEY FILL DIRECTLY AFFECT UAE SECURITY. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT SOME OF POSITIONS ARE NOT IMPORTANT -- E.G. BRITISH NATIONAL WHO IS ABU DHABI DIRECTOR OF FINANCE OR COMPATRIOT WHO HEADS CURRENCY BOARD, IN EFFECT CENTRAL BANK. BUT THERE ARE OTHER INDIVIDUALS, BOTH LOCALS AND EXPATRIATES OF OTHER NATIONALITIES WHO ALSO HAVE MAJOR VOICE IN THESE AREAS.

3. IN TERMS OF TRENDS AMONG CIVILIAN ADVISORS, CLEARLY AS EDUCATIONAL LEVELS IMPROVE PRESSURES WILL INCREASE TO FILL JOBS WITH LOCAL CITIZENS. AND EVEN PRIOR TO THAT TIME, BRITISH ADVISORS IN PARTICULAR MAY BE CONVENIENT TARGETS IN CASES LOCAL IN-FIGHTING -- WITNESS SOME RECENT PRESS ATTACKS ON CURRENCY BOARD HEAD. BUT FOR PRESENT THERE DOES NOT APPEAR BE SAME SORT OF CONCERTED EFFORT TO ARABIZE ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS AS EXISTS ON MILITARY/

SECURITY SIDE. IN SHORT BRITS AS WELL AS OTHER EXPATRIATE
CIVILIAN ADVISORS ARE LIKELY BE HERE FOR SOME TIME, BUT
WITH LIMITED INFLUENCE AT LEAST IN TERMS UAE INTERNAL/
EXTERNAL SECURITY.
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